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Abstract Discoveries about attitude aggregation have prompted the re-emergence
of non-reductionism, the theory that group agency is irreducible to individual
agency. This paper rejects the revival of non-reductionism and, in so doing, chal-
lenges the preference for a unified account, according to which, agency, in all its
manifestations, is rational. First, I offer a clarifying reconstruction of the new
argument against reductionism (due to Christian List and Philip Pettit). Second, I
show that a hitherto silent premise, namely, that an identified group intention need
not be determined by member attitudes according to a rule, e.g., majority, is false.
Third, I show that, on rejecting this premise, the aggregation results lead instead to
the conclusion that, in contrast to individual agency, group agency is non-rational.
Keywords Group agency  Collective intentionality  Judgement aggregation 
Social ontology  Reductionism  Discursive dilemma
There are many scenarios in which a set of individual acts appears to constitute a
group act rather than merely a sum of individual acts. Accounting for this
appearance, theorists posit that a group itself may act. Some scenarios feature
member-wide consensus on the act’s performance, e.g., a sports team executing a
pass play (Searle 1990), a team of volunteers painting a house (Bratman 1992), a
couple walking on a beach (Gilbert 1990). Accordingly, theorists agree that a group
may act if, ‘[e]ach participant… wills [the shared activity]’ (Roth 2010). But whilst
sufficient for group action, member unanimity is not necessary. Scenarios that
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feature member disagreement may similarly prompt ascription of a group act, e.g.,
scenarios featuring votes by the members of corporate boards, legislative chambers
and collegiate courts. Thus, it is said that, equally, a group may act if the group
itself, that is, the board, the senate, or the court, forms an appropriate intention (e.g.,
Copp 1995; Pettit 2001; Kornhauser and Sager 2004). It follows that group agency
is instantiated by both unanimous and non-unanimous acts. The ontological issues
concern, on the one hand, the relation between a group member’s intention that a
particular act be collectively performed and the ordinary intentions involved in her
individual agency, and, on the other, the relation between a group’s attitudes and
those of its members.
Non-reductionism about unanimous group agency is the view that a group
member’s intention that a particular act be collectively performed is a primitive
attitude (e.g., Searle 1990). Reductionism about unanimous agency holds, to the
contrary, that such intentions are determined by one’s ordinary individual intentions
(e.g., Bratman 1992). Conversely, non-reductionism about non-unanimous agency
denies that a group’s intention is determined by its members’ attitudes according to
a rule, such as by majority (e.g., List and Pettit 2006; Schweikard 2008). The
reductionist about non-unanimous agency holds, in contrast, that a group’s intention
is rule-determined (e.g., Copp 1995; Kornhauser and Sager 2004). At issue in each
debate is whether reductionism succeeds in avoiding, ‘an additional premium for
explaining the same phenomena’ (Tenenbaum 2015, 3379), namely, the group acts
ascribed in practical discourse. Lately, non-reductionism about non-unanimous
group agency has become newly influential (Schweikard and Schmid 2013). This
paper revisits the argument prompting its revival. The argument in question does
indeed reveal something about the nature of group agency, but it is not what non-
reductionists think.1
Contemporary non-reductionism is the product of technical inquiry into the
aggregation of attitudes. The results of this inquiry have led to the positing of what
we shall call the, ‘rationality-reducibility dilemma’: that not all group intentions
identified in discourse are both rational and rule-determined. Following Christian
List and Philip Pettit, many take this dilemma to support the conclusion that not all
identified group intentions are rule-determined. Such reasoning relies on a silent
assumption, namely, that an identified group intention need not be rule-determined.
This assumption proves to be problematic.
Next to the analogy between the rationality of individual and group agency is an
analogy between the determination by physical processes of individual attitudes and
the determination by member attitudes of group attitudes. The latter analogy, while
venerable, obscures a critical disparity in the means by which individual and group
attitudes may be identified. We come to know an individual’s attitude without
reference to its determinants. Through an individual’s first-person testimony, we
rely instead on an individual’s special access to her own attitudes. Due to the
1 Henceforth, ‘non-reductionism’, will refer solely to non-reductionism about non-unanimous group
agency.
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inability of groups to give first-person testimony, a comparable means of identifying
a group’s attitude is unavailable. Consequently, it seems that, unlike individual
intention, group intention may only be identified by reference to its determinants.
The significance of the rationality-reducibility dilemma must therefore be revisited.
It turns out that, rather than showing that not all group intentions are rule-
determined, it shows, instead, that not all group intentions are rational.
Recent technical results do advance the debate on the nature of group agency,
and, hence, rightly guide both positive political theory (e.g., Vermeule 2011), and
normative inquiries into matters of institutional design (e.g., Chilton and Tingley
2012) and corporate responsibility (e.g., Hess 2014). But they do so in an
unexpected way. Rather than revealing that non-reductionism alone can explain the
pertinent phenomena, what they really reveal is that it is, after all, ‘wrong to attempt
to establish a parallel… in which the collectivity is… governed by the same
principle of rationality as the individual’ (Coleman 1972, 212). The analogy
between the rationality of individual and group agency comes naturally; in
consequence, it has escaped deserved scrutiny. We find that, properly construed, the
aggregation results suggest that, to preserve a useful notion of group agency, some
features of the model of rational individual agency must be jettisoned. Paradigmatic
group intentions are not all wholly rational.
1 Rejecting reductionism
This first section presents a clarifying reconstruction of List and Pettit’s argument
for non-reductionism. Clarity is advanced in three respects, each pertaining to List
and Pettit’s defence of the argument’s first primary premise, that, if all identified
group intentions are rational, then not all identified group intentions are rule-
determined. First, the reconstruction makes explicit the sub-argument that supports
this premise comprising List and Pettit’s claims about attitude aggregation and
discourse about groups. Second, the resultant clarity on the structure of this sub-
argument reveals that it incorporates a silent assumption, to wit, that an identified
group intention need not be rule-determined. Having acknowledged this assump-
tion, we are better placed to assess the plausibility of List and Pettit’s overall
argument for non-reductionism. Third, the reconstruction distinguishes one way in
which List and Pettit interpret their own notion of a, ‘straw vote procedure’, namely,
as just another sort of rule. Distinguishing group intentions determined by a, ‘straw
vote procedure’, as thus interpreted from group intentions that are not rule-
determined facilitates assessment of the (hitherto silent) assumption that an
identified group intention need not be rule-determined. The second section presents
an assessment of this assumption.
Statements 1–3 (S1–3) comprise List and Pettit’s primary argument:
1. If all identified group intentions are rational, then not all identified group
intentions are rule-determined
2. All identified group intentions are rational
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Hence,
3. Not all identified group intentions are rule-determined
Consider S1 and S2 in turn.
S1
In defence of the premise that, if all identified group intentions are rational, then
not all identified group intentions are rule-determined, List and Pettit offer the
subsidiary argument SI-1:
I. If discourse successfully identifies group intentions, then not all identified group
intentions are both rational and rule-determined
II. Discourse successfully identifies group intentions
Hence,
III. Not all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined
Hence, S1:
1. If all identified group intentions are rational, then not all identified group
intentions are rule-determined
SI
The premise that, if discourse successfully identifies group intentions, then not all
identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined (SI), presupposes
that a rational group intention is one which is rationally related to the agent’s beliefs
about the justifications for performing the act in question: a [rational] collective…
act[s] in pursuit of a single set of desires, in accordance with a single set of beliefs
[List and Pettit 2011, vii (henceforth ‘LP’)]. This reflects our understanding of a
rational individual intention as one determined, ‘on the basis of an overall practical
assessment of [one’s] options and opportunities’ (Shpall and Wilson 2012). (We
shall later discover that we have reason to adopt an alternative model of group
rationality.) SI derives its key support from a mathematical insight into the
aggregation of attitudes.
Inquiry into attitude aggregation has yielded a series of impossibility results.
These reveal that, even where individual member attitudes are themselves mutually
consistent, there is no rule, bar dictatorship, by which member intentions and beliefs
always determine mutually consistent group intentions and beliefs (summarized in
LP 66-67). This finding is known as the, ‘discursive dilemma’ (LP 46). Some rules
will resolve the initially inconsistent group attitudes which they generate. But,
crucially, any resolution of a set of inconsistent attitudes into a set of rational
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attitudes involves reflection on the part of the agent, i.e., ‘to and fro adjustment…
going back and forth between different mutually inconsistent judgments… to decide
where to adjust’ [LP 61 (citing Rawls 1971)].
Certain rules resolve the initial inconsistencies to which they give rise in ex ante
fashion. For instance, a rule might specify that, in case of inconsistency, the group’s
intention is the intention that is implied by the group’s beliefs about the applicable
justifications: tak[e] certain propositions as… potential premises… and let[] the…
majority-determined views on those premises dictate the collective view to be taken
on the conclusion (List and Pettit 2002, 105). Alternatively, a rule might specify
that, in case of inconsistency, the group’s intention is determined by its chairman
alone: the plenipotentiary might have the… power of deciding how the group should
go in the event of a paradox arising (List and Pettit 2002, 103). Neither such
resolution of attitudinal inconsistency involves reflection on the part of the agent,
however. Accordingly, such rules are not guaranteed to determine attitudes that are
rational, as opposed to merely consistent. Still, not all rules resolve inconsistency in
a way that excludes reflection. List and Pettit describe an alternative, the, ‘straw-
vote procedure’ (SVP):
[C]onsider all the different possible ways in which previously formed attitudes
or the new attitude could be revised so as to restore consistency. Take a vote
under a suitable procedure… on which of the possible revisions to make (LP
62).
Rather than excluding reflection on the part of the agent, SVPs would resolve
attitudinal inconsistencies by determining a further, bespoke, which-attitude-to-
revise group attitude. For instance, an SVP might specify that, in case of
inconsistency, the group intention is determined by the majority belief on which
group attitude to revise.2 Though itself rule-determined, the group’s which-attitude-
to-revise attitude would be the product of the group’s reflection on the particular
inconsistency at issue. Presumably, an SVP-resolved group intention would
therefore qualify as rational. But the possibility of rules that resolve inconsistency
in a reflective fashion is one thing; whether, in ascribing group intention, we
actually refer to such rules, is another.3
In general, we do not ascribe group attitudes by reference to an SVP (LP 64).
When, for instance, inconsistent majority attitudes emerge on a collegiate court of
law, no further vote is taken on which majority attitude to revise (Kornhauser and
Sager 1986, 115). Nonetheless, the inability of alternative rules to guarantee
2 Such a procedure resembles that described in Pettit 2003 (161), which draws, in turn, on the suggestion
in Kornhauser and Sager 1993 (33–36).
3 Moreover, a limitation to the SVP just described is that, over three or more alternatives, the majority
attitudinal relation may be intransitive (alternative x is preferred to y, y is preferred to z, and z to x)
(Condorcet 1785). Hence, the rule might fail to resolve a set of initially inconsistent attitudes into a set of
rational attitudes because it yields an intransitive further attitude over the revisional alternatives: intention
[belief about justification1; belief about justification1[belief about justification2; belief about
justification2[intention.
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rationality fails to check the invocation of group intention, ‘in common and in
scientific discourse’ (LP 4). It follows that the group intentions actually invoked in
discourse could not all qualify as being both rational and rule-determined. It
follows, in turn, that, if discourse successfully identifies group intentions, then not
all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined (SI).
SII
Ideally, the theory of group agency would redeem rather than repudiate our, ‘talk
of group agents’ (LP 5). We assume, therefore, that discourse does successfully
identify group intentions (SII): the ascription of agency to groups expresses a
correct and important observation (LP 4).
SIII
Assuming, first, that if discourse successfully identifies group intentions, then not
all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined (SI); and,
second, that discourse successfully identifies group intentions (SII), it follows that
not all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined (SIII):
[T]he attitudes… we need to ascribe to any group that meets the conditions of
[rational] agency are not readily reducible to the attitudes of individuals (LP
5).
The proposition that not all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-
determined (SIII) may be described as the rationality-reducibility dilemma. The
dilemma’s importance lies in its support for the first premise of List and Pettit’s
primary argument for non-reductionism (S1): if all identified group intentions are
rational, then not all identified group intentions are rule-determined. List and Pettit
appear to seek to deduce S1, ‘[I]f a group agent is to display… rationality… [then]
its attitudes cannot be a majoritarian or other equally simple function of the attitudes
of its members (LP 8)’, from the rationality-reducibility dilemma alone:
III. Not all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined
Hence, S1:
1. If all identified group intentions are rational, then not all identified group
intentions are rule-determined
The inference from SIII to S1 is problematic. It might be the case that, to be
identified, a group intention must be rule-determined. If so, then, contrary to the
premise that, if all identified group intentions are rational, then not all identified
group intentions are rule-determined (S1), but consistently with the conclusion that
not all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined (SIII), there
is no scenario in which an identified group intention could fail to be rule-
determined. Therefore, the argument SIII-1 must introduce the further premise that
an identified group intention need not be rule-determined (SIV).
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SIV
The rationality-reducibility dilemma implies that, if all identified group
intentions are rational, then not all identified group intentions are rule-determined
(S1), just in case an identified group intention need not be rule-determined (SIV).
Whilst they fail to introduce SIV as a step in their argument, List and Pettit do
remark that: [W]e will be unable to recognize the kind of group agent we have in
mind as an agent… if we keep our gaze fixed at the level of individuals (LP 76). The
implicature is that we are able, in principle, to recognize group intentions that are
not rule-determined, and, hence, that an identified group intention need not be rule-
determined (SIV). Accordingly, we integrate SIV into SIII-1:
III. Not all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined
IV. An identified group intention need not be rule-determined
Hence, S1:
1. If all identified group intentions are rational, then not all identified group
intentions are rule-determined
S2
S2 states the common assumption that all identified group intentions are rational:
[W]e can deal with a group agent as if it were an individual person’ (LP 13). S2 is
justified on the basis that discourse recognizes rational group agency only: [W]e
regard a group as an agent just when we think something is amiss if [its] attitudes
are inconsistent, or otherwise irrational (LP 39).
S3
Taken together, the respective premises that, if all identified group intentions are
rational, then not all identified group intentions are rule-determined (S1), and that
all identified group intentions are rational (S2), imply that not all identified group
intentions are rule-determined (S3): [O]n some matters the attitudes embraced by a
group agent are not a systematic function of the attitudes of members (LP 10).
Accordingly, the initial technical insight that rules may determine inconsistent
group attitudes (the discursive dilemma) leads ultimately to the ontological
conclusion that group attitudes, ‘are not… reducible’, to individual attitudes (LP
76-77). S1–3 vindicates the view that the determination of a group’s intention may
merely, ‘turn out to mimic some [rule]… implementation [of which] is a
consequence of the functionally inexplicit organizational structure’ (LP 61-62).
The foregoing reconstruction of List and Pettit’s argument for non-reductionism
achieves three points of clarification, each pertaining to the defence of the
argument’s first primary premise, that, if all identified group intentions are rational,
then not all identified group intentions are rule-determined (S1).4 The first point of
4 There is a forerunner to List and Pettit’s mature argument which fails to deliver a repudiation of
reductionism:
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clarification consists in the explicit specification of the logical function of List and
Pettit’s claims about attitude aggregation and group agency talk. Thus, SI-1 renders
transparent the reasoning leading from the discursive dilemma (SI) to the
rationality-reducibility dilemma (SIII), and, finally, to the premise that, if all
identified group intentions are rational, then not all identified group intentions are
rule-determined (S1). The second point of clarification consists in the acknowl-
edgement of a premise on which the defence of S1 silently relies, namely, that an
identified group intention need not be rule-determined (SIV). Without SIV, S1
cannot be derived from the intermediate conclusion that not all identified group
intentions are both rational and rule-determined (SIII).
The third point of clarification is interpretive. Our discussion of the claim that, if
discourse successfully identifies group intentions, then not all identified group
intentions are both rational and rule-determined (SI) involves a regimentation of
List and Pettit’s notion of the straw vote procedure. Officially, List and Pettit
characterize SVPs as non-rule functions (LP 62). However, in their stated example
of an SVP, quoted above, what they in fact describe is the determination of group
attitudes according to a particular type of rule. Naturally, we are free to interpret the
notion of the SVP as we please. But any assessment of the claim that an identified
group intention need not be rule-determined (SIV) that mistook our identification of
SVP-example determined group intentions for the identification of group intentions
that are not rule-determined would be unreliable. By distinguishing SVP-example
type rules from non-rule functions, we avoid such potential confusion.
In the second section, we duly assess the claim that an identified group intention
need not be rule-determined (SIV) and find it to be false. The consequence is not
just that List and Pettit’s argument fails to prove non-reductionism but also that their
claims about attitude aggregation and practical discourse imply that group agency is
not wholly rational.
Footnote 4 continued
First premise: there is no intention without a minimum of rationality on the part of the relevant
agent. Second premise: collectives can display that minimum of rationality only insofar as they
collectivise reason, as I shall put it. Conclusion: only groups that collectivise reason can properly
have intentions (Pettit 2001, 241).
Pettit’s second premise (2001) corresponds to S1. But it is different in two respects. It is stronger in that it
asserts that rational group intentions could not be rule-determined. (It is unclear how this assertion may be
derived from the discursive dilemma, i.e., from the insight that rules are liable to determine
inconsistencies.) Crucially, it is also weaker than S1: it does not refer to actual group intentions. Pettit’s
conclusion (2001) is accordingly weaker than List and Pettit’s (2011) conclusion that not all identified
group intentions are rule-determined (S3). Unlike S3, it does not state that groups do have intentions that
are not rule-determined. Instead, it leaves open the possibility that we ought to consider groups to lack
intentions whenever the alternative is to posit intentions that are not rule-determined. Pettit’s original
syllogism thus fails to establish that group attitudes, ‘are not a systematic function of the attitudes of
members’ (LP 10). Pettit 2001 notably proceeds, nevertheless, to endorse S3: [M]any collectivities will
[collectivize reason] [250 (emphasis added)].
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2 Rejecting rationality
Though its discovery was spurred by interest in the nature of group agency, the
discursive dilemma does not in itself shed light on the subject. It does so only
granted the claims about the content and the philosophical status respectively of
discourse about group agency reflected in SI and SII. Even then, the resultant insight
takes the form of a further dilemma, that not all identified group intentions are both
rational and rule determined (SIII). Any consequent insight to which the rationality-
reducibility dilemma might itself give rise depends on the assumption that an
identified group intention need not be rule-determined (SIV). If so, then the
dilemma ultimately establishes, as anticipated, the irreducibility of group agency. If,
conversely, an identified group intention must be rule-determined, then the dilemma
establishes, instead, that group agency is not wholly rational. Recall List and Pettit’s
implicit endorsement of the assumption that an identified group intention need not
be rule-determined:
[W]e will be unable to recognize the kind of group agent we have in mind as
an agent… if we keep our gaze fixed at the level of individuals. We will fail to
see the wood for the trees. (LP 76)
It turns out that the kind of group agent that is revealed at the level of individuals is
the only kind of group agent that we are able to recognize. This limitation is
obscured by an enduringly attractive analogy between the determination of
individual and group attitudes respectively:
The conception of the relationship which unites the social substratum and the
social life is at every point analogous to that which undeniably exists between
the physiological substratum and the psychic life of individuals (Durkheim
1953, 25).
The analogy appears in a current register in the suggestion that patterns in the
behaviour of groups are, ‘as elusive at the individual level as the patterns in the
behavior of individuals are elusive at the neuronal’ (Pettit 2014, 1655; similarly, LP
78).5 In contrast to individuals’ attitudes, however, if groups’ attitudes are elusive at
the determinant level, they are irredeemably so. In the case of groups, if not
individuals, it seems that we cannot see the wood but for seeing the trees.
We come to know an individual’s attitudes through her behaviour, including,
notably, her testimony. We do so without reference to the internal physical
processes that actually determine her attitudes. We simply trust what she says about
them on the assumption that, ‘of [her] own thoughts [she] cannot but be aware’
5 Deborah Tollefsen extends Durkheim’s analogy explicitly by employing Daniel Dennett’s notion of
descriptive ‘efficiency’:
[T]here is an [intentional] description of human behaviour that is more efficient than a description
that cites microphysical properties… [Equally] there are patterns that are missed if one attempts to
explain the social world by appealing only to individual intentional states [Tollefsen 2002, 43
(citing Dennett 1991)].
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(Wright 2012, 402). Accordingly, individual attitude is identifiable irrespective of
how it is determined. Obviously, groups, unlike individuals, cannot speak (or
otherwise behave) for their own part. It is suggested that we gain access to a group’s
attitudes through third-person testimony, that is, through what is said on a group’s
behalf by individuals: Just as I may say of myself… so the spokespersons for a
group agent may say of it… (LP 182). The question is whether testimony also
allows us to learn a group’s attitude without reference to its determinants. If so,
then, similarly, group attitude is identifiable irrespective of how it is determined,
and, hence, an identified group intention need not be rule-determined (SIV).
It is true that, all things being equal, one is worse off relying on the
spokesperson’s testimony than on that of the principal. The inferiority of third-
person testimony has been said to leave groups at a disadvantage in respect of the
performance of speech acts:
[The] spokesperson may make mistakes in their interpretation of the
corporation’s attitudes in a way that has no equivalent to the singular case…
[she may] misread the instruction given to her by the CEO, or some such…
Thus… [her role] is far from being on a par with… first person authority…
(Schmid 2014, 1696–97)
Still, in principle at least, reliance on third-person testimony does not require
knowledge of how attitudes are actually determined. Take the case of the individual
principal, e.g., a prime minister. While we are unable to say of the spokesman that
he, ‘cannot but be aware’, of the prime minister’s attitudes, we can say so of the
prime minister herself. We may expect the spokesman, and, therefore, the public, to
discover the prime minister’s attitude through the prime minister’s private
utterances without reference to its neuronal determinants. It is believed that third-
person testimony allows us to learn a group’s attitude on a comparable basis:
[W]hen we explain your attitudes by the evidence to hand… we register
information that would not have been readily available… at the neuronal
level… This… argues equally… for regarding group[s]… as agents in their
own right (Pettit 2014, 1654).
Third-person testimony in fact fails to provide equivalent access to the attitudes of
individuals and groups. This is because a subject’s self-knowledge, on which all
testimonial identification of individual attitudes ultimately depends, may be the
subject of first-person testimony only.
Self-knowledge refers to knowledge of one’s own mental states, including one’s
attitudes. It contrasts with knowledge of the external world, including, notably, the
attitudes of others. Following our folk concept, most philosophers accept that one
may arrive at self-knowledge by accessing one’s mental states in a way that is
exclusively available to oneself (Gertler 2015). The existence of an exclusive means
of self-knowledge divides knowledge of others’ attitudes into the parasitical and
non-parasitical. Parasitical knowledge relies on the subject’s exclusive means of
access. Non-parasitical knowledge, in contrast, relies on non-exclusive access, such
as on the subject’s (non-testimonial) behaviour, on social scientific generalization,
or on the statuses of its attitudes’ determinants, e.g., the neuronal activities of a
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subject’s brain.6 Parasitical knowledge of a subject’s attitude is enabled by
testimony: [A]vowals are thought to capture a special form of self-knowledge that
has private origins (Bar-On and Long 2003, 179). It is by enabling parasitical
knowledge that testimony allows us to learn a subject’s attitude without reference to
its determinants. Crucially, testimony can only enable knowledge, parasitical or
otherwise, if the entity in sole possession can speak its own mind.
To attain through testimony any knowledge of which some entity is in sole
possession, the entity in question must be able, on its own behalf, to testify as to
what it knows. A chain of testimony ending in a third party’s opinion is insufficient.
Thus, we are only able to explain our identification of individuals’ attitudes as
parasitical knowledge because individuals may speak for themselves. Conversely,
we are unable to similarly explain our identification of group attitudes because
groups, in contrast, cannot speak for themselves. Even if a group, like an individual,
possessed exclusive access to its attitudes, being unable to convey anything for
itself, it could not share what it had learned. Any analogy between the determination
of individual and group attitudes is liable to obscure this disparity. It is an
individual’s ability to give first-person testimony which allows us to identify her
attitude without reference to its determinants; groups are not similarly endowed.
Parasitical knowledge of a group’s attitude is unavailable. In its absence,
identifying a group’s attitude means referring to its determinants. Thus, a group’s
attitude is identifiable only if it is a function of something more basic, namely,
member attitudes. This implication undermines the theory that a group’s intention is
an emergent, ‘living force’ (Figgis 1913, 40; similarly, Rovane 2014). The
achievement of ontological parsimony has already persuaded most contemporary
theorists (e.g., Searle 1990) to reject such theories, including, notably, List and
Pettit: the agency of group agents depends wholly on the organization and behavior
of individual members (LP 4).7 But emergentism is not the only variety of non-
reductionism that is undermined by the fact that identifying a group’s attitude means
referring to its determinants. Non-reductionist theories that acknowledge that a
group’s intention does indeed depend on its members’ attitudes are equally
vulnerable.
Crucially, to identify an entity’s attitude by reference to its determinants, the
entity’s attitudes must be determined according to a rule. Members’ (first-person)
testimony, i.e., their votes, allows us parasitical knowledge of the respective statuses
of the individual member attitudes on which the group’s attitude depends. But the
profile of members’ attitudes on a particular question can indicate a group attitude
only if we know which profiles suffice for a given group attitude to obtain. Such
knowledge, in turn, requires knowledge of the rule with which the determination of
6 As a practical matter, of course, parasitical knowledge is indispensable. Non-testimonial behaviour may
provide a basis for ascribing attitudes such as anger or arousal, but not a decision to prohibit the sale of a
drug or to offer a particular contract. Neuroscience is equally unable to discern such attitudes. Social
scientific generalization, in turn, relies on parasitical knowledge of the attitudes of the sample population.
7 Emergentism fails to, ‘keep[] down the number of fundamentally different kinds of entity’ (Lewis 1973,
87).
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the group’s attitudes by members’ attitudes accords.8 For instance, to know that the
existence of a majority member attitude on a particular question suffices for a
corresponding group attitude to obtain, we must know that the group’s attitudes are
determined by the majority member attitude. Thus, to proceed to identify a group’s
attitude from members’ attitudes, members’ attitudes must determine the group’s
attitudes according to a rule. It follows that, in the absence of any alternative to
identifying a group’s attitude by reference to its determinants, an identified group
attitude, notably, an identified group intention, must be rule-determined, that is,
derivable from an explicit, ‘organizational structure’.
Strictly, a theory of group agency need not aspire to explain practical discourse
about group acts. It is for that reason that non-reductionism is merely undermined,
rather than flatly refuted, by the fact that an identified group intention must be rule-
determined. Nevertheless, the described aspiration seems crucial to such a theory’s
plausibility (Copp 1980, 581). In its absence, it would be unclear what purpose the
addition of the pertinent subcategory of agency would serve. Conversely, the
reducibility of identified group intentions has immediate relevance for the
interpretation of the rationality-reducibility dilemma: Not all identified group
intentions are both rational and rule-determined (SIII). Any insight that the dilemma
yields depends on what we otherwise know to be true of such intentions. The fact
that they must be rule-determined entails that the dilemma fails to support the first
primary premise of List and Pettit’s argument for non-reductionism, namely, that, if
all identified group intentions are rational, then not all identified group intentions are
rule-determined (S1). On the contrary, it follows, instead, that the dilemma implies
that not all such intentions are rational (:S2):
A. Not all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined (SIII)
B. An identified group intention must be rule-determined (:SIV)
Hence,
C. Not all identified group intentions are rational (:S2)
Given the rationality-reducibility dilemma, rejection of the assumption that an
identified group intention need not be rule determined leads to the conclusion that
not all identified group intentions are rational (C). This conclusion is striking for
contradicting S2, the common theoretical assumption that group agency, like
individual agency, is rational. In principle, it might be thought that this result is
paradoxical.
Notice that the conclusion that not all identified group intentions are rational
refers solely to the full-dress kind of rationality associated with individual
intentions. The rationality-reducibility dilemma, on which that conclusion depends,
itself derives from SI, the premise that, if discourse successfully identifies group
intentions, then not all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-
8 If the rule is subject to a defeating condition, e.g., that, if rule-specified attitudes are irrational, then no
attitude is properly determined, then knowledge of this condition is evidently also necessary.
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determined. SI, recall, presupposes that a rational group intention is rationally
related to the agent’s beliefs about the justifications for performing the act in
question. Accordingly, the conclusion that not all identified group intentions are
rational (C) states only that not all identified group intentions are rationally related
to the agent’s beliefs. Thus, if we assume that, unlike an individual intention, a
group intention need not be rationally related to beliefs but need only satisfy more
minimal rationality conditions, then C is consigned to triviality. The question
prompted by A–C, therefore, is not whether it is paradoxical that there are group
intentions that are altogether irrational but merely whether it is paradoxical that
there are group intentions that are not rationally related to beliefs. There seems little
reason to think that it is.
The premise that, if discourse successfully identifies group intentions, then not all
identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined (SI) is based in part
on an observation about the content of discourse, namely, that the inability of rules
to guarantee rationally related group attitudes fails to check ascription of group
intention. Equally, it is possible to test whether our reluctance to ascribe non-
rational individual intentions does actually extend to group intentions (LP 40). A
group’s intention is commonly ascribed on the basis of the same voting procedure in
every case. Thus, group intention is not only ascribed notwithstanding any
inconsistency to which the pertinent rule gives rise but is ascribed in perceived
reliance on that rule.9 In principle, this practice might be the result of a mistaken
assumption that the rule has not, in fact, given rise to inconsistency. But this
explanation overlooks cases featuring explicit intention-belief inconsistency. A
prominent example is the ascription of collegiate court decisions on the basis of a
majority of members’ decision votes even as members’ published reasons indicate
inconsistent majority beliefs (Kornhauser and Sager 1993, 21).10 Thus, whereas our
observed willingness to ascribe group intentions supports SI, it suggests, equally,
that group intention, unlike individual intention, need not be rationally related to the
agent’s beliefs. It seems, therefore, that an approach that distinguishes the
minimalist rationality of group intention from the full-dress rationality of its
individual counterpart is not paradoxical. Such an approach would render the
disjunction between rule-determinacy and full-dress rationality (A–C) unproblem-
atic. Moreover, we find no equivalent disjunction between rule-determinacy and
minimalist rationality.
Our willingness to ascribe group intentions does not extend to those that are
completely irrational. Thus, it is difficult to conceive of an intransitive intention,
individual or group, over multiple alternatives. We know from Condorcet’s
scenario, in which majorities prefer alternative x to y, alternative y to z and z to x,
9 This is consistent with List and Pettit’s primary premise that, if all identified group intentions are
rational, then not all identified group intentions are rule-determined (S1). Grant that an identified group
intention need not be rule-determined (SIV). If so, one might, in principle, identify a rational group
intention that is not rule-determined even while mistakenly thinking that one had relied on a rule.
10 Exemplified in the US Supreme Court case of National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co. (1949) 337 United States Reports 582, of which, dissenting Justice Felix Frankfurter observed,
‘conflicting minorities in combination bring to pass a result’ (665).
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that rules by which member attitudes determine group intentions need not guarantee
a transitive intention. In contrast to cases featuring explicit intention-belief
inconsistency, the ascription of a group intention in Condorcet’s scenario is
standardly considered problematic. Crucially, however, while tallying decision
votes alone will not reveal a rule’s derivation of inconsistent group beliefs, it will
reveal a rule’s derivation of an intransitive intention. Consequently, a rule’s inability
to guarantee transitivity should check ascriptions of group intention. It follows that
the discovery of the impossibility of any rule that satisfies a set of conditions that
includes such a guarantee (Arrow 1950) does not support a claim that, if discourse
successfully identifies group intentions, then not all identified group intentions are
both transitive and rule-determined. Hence, Arrow’s result fails to provide a
foundation for an A–C-equivalent argument for the (genuinely paradoxical)
conclusion that not all identified group intentions are transitive. The disjunction
between rule-determinacy and full-dress rationality is not accompanied by a further
disjunction between rule-determinacy and minimalist rationality. Accordingly, an
alternative minimalist model of group rationality is available which is neither
paradoxical nor is, itself, the subject of a paradox.
The described disjunction between rule-determinacy and full-dress rationality
threatens the ostensibly reasonable pursuit of a fully unified theory of agency: an
account of collective action should be based upon the most successful accounts of
individual action (Chant 2007, 245). In principle, we might eliminate this threat by
rejecting one of the disjunction’s constituent assumptions. In light of the argument
outlined above, we shall take it that questioning the premise that an identified group
intention must be rule-determined (B) is off-limits. That leaves the rationality-
reducibility dilemma, that not all identified group intentions are both rational and
rule-determined (variously denoted as A and SIII). The dilemma is jointly implied
by the premises SI, that, if discourse successfully identifies group intentions, then
not all identified group intentions are both rational and rule-determined, and SII,
that discourse successfully identifies group intentions. Abandoning SI means
rejecting the theoretical consideration from which it derives, to wit, that rules are
unable to always determine group intentions that are rationally related to group
beliefs. The aggregation results render rejection of this consideration equally off-
limits. Abandoning SII might not, in contrast, be off-limits but it would leave
unclear what purpose the addition of a subcategory of non-unanimous group agency
might serve. Moreover, abandoning SII would, in turn, make it arbitrary to favour a
theory of individual agency that is vindicated by discourse about individual acts,
i.e., one that states that individual intentions must exhibit full-dress rationality.
Preserving a fully unified account of individual and group action by seeking to
dissolve the disjunction between rule-determinacy and full-dress rationality is
unavoidably costly. Accordingly, it may be preferable to abandon such an account
in favour of one that incorporates a minimalist model of group rationality that
consists merely in conditions such as transitivity. On this approach, the disjunction
reveals that, in fact, the most successful accounts of individual and group action
diverge.
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3 Conclusion
Recent discoveries about attitude aggregation have attracted deserved attention for
revealing a dilemma in the theory of group agency: group agency cannot be both
wholly rational and reducible to individual attitudes. Thus far, the dilemma has
prompted a rejection of reductionism. We saw that this response, due to Christian
List and Philip Pettit, rests on a silent assumption about the means available to
identify a group’s intention. This assumption turns out to be false. The dilemma’s
failure to refute reductionism has significance beyond the immediate ontological
question. It removes a perceived motivation both for an alternative positive political
theory and for the extension to groups of moral responsibility. Moreover, we are left
with a choice between dissolving the dilemma or accepting that group agency is not
wholly rational. Given the onerous costs associated with the former, it seems
preferable to abandon a fully unified account of agency in favour of one that
incorporates a distinct, minimalist model of group rationality.
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